Hegel vs. Kierkegaard
While Hegel never actually framed his own ideas in terms of “thesis, antithesis, synthesis“, it is still a decent way of understanding the issue I would like to present. In opposition to the “formalistic” reasoning of a mathematical and mechanistic worldview (a la Newton), he suggested a much more organic view wherein conflicting forms of thinking/consciousness are synthesized into a “higher” form of reasoning through history. Art, philosophy and Christian religion each give us insight into the future culmination of this rational process.
Kierkegaard, in stark and explicit opposition to Hegel, claimed that such a synthesis of traditions amounts to a wishy-washy corruption of each in which we attempt, but fail to have it both ways. Self-defining choices must be made. He thus contrasted the aesthetic, ethical/rational and religious lives (Kierkegaard’s view of the ethical/rational life is VERY close to the moral society which I have been discussing in recent posts), insisting that none of these consists of a synthesis of the other two. He especially objected to any attempts at synthesizing religion and reason together – using Abraham as his go-to counter-example.
The question, then, is which of these models better expresses Mormon thought on the subject? On the one hand, we frequently find references in the scriptures to a choice which we all must make between trusting and following the religious ways of God and the secular arm of flesh. On the other, we also find directions (which are strangely difficult to come by within the scriptures) to take the good from the rest of the world and build it into the gospel, thus creating one great whole (again, a phrase which does not seem to be all that scriptural).
I think a full Hegelian reading is totally and utterly contrary to the gospel, despite those bloggers who wish to pit the church against those who are “on the side of history” (a very Hegelian phrase). While I do think Kierkegaard is a bit closer to LDS sentiment, I also think that his either/or reasoning does not accurately represent the openness which Mormons do have to science, etc. The half-way point which probably best expresses what I take the church to teach would be that we are free to pick and choose those rational elements that we wish to integrate within our religion, but never the other way around. (To be learned is good, if…)
Of course, this half-way point is FAR closer to Kierkegaard than it is to Hegel. Hegel holds that all sides must compromise and transform each other in a dynamic process that tends toward higher reason and consciousness. Kierkegaard, by contrast, holds that one must choose which side they will not compromise on in a very unilateral and asymmetrical sense that is quite foreign to Hegel. (Hegel’s master/slave dialectic is a clear illustration of how the master achieves a higher state of consciousness through allowing the slave to transform him.) Religious faith can transform reason and art, but never the other way around. It is the incompatibility between these worldviews, combined with the non-negotiability of religious faith that makes it (religious faith) utterly incapable of rational justification.
It is for reasons such as these that I am so strongly suspicious of theology and apologetics. Such practices encourage the Hegelian idea of synthesizing of reason and religion in a way that leaves the latter open to transformation from the former. In Hegelian language, I am perfectly comfortable with reason being the slave, so long as it remains the slave without any ideas that the religious master can or will “progress to a higher level” by being open to transformation by of synthesis with it.
I think an interesting way to look at this is how Mormons deal with other people’s religions. I think there has been a trend among younger mormons to identify with other people who are religious and less with those that are atheist or apply reason as a critique of religion. However, there is still a large contingent of mormons that find religious practices that are not-LDS (particularly those not in the protestant tradition) as ridiculous superstitions or downright contemptible. Faith healers, animists, shrine worshipers, etc. were not treated as people “doing religion differently” but as cranks or simpletons. The change comes from both the left and right, with the left because of tolerance and the tradition of acceptance, from the right as a form of defense of the primacy of religion over reason.
Again, I think the analogy to Trump is valid in that he is just showing that politics is above reason. I think the resistance of many mormons to Trump calls upon the heritage of normalization of religion within the limits set for it under the protestant enlightenment.
Although Hegel may be wrong on the morals, he sure seems more accurate about the history which always seems to be an evolving mash-up rather than a clear choice.
I don’t think most mormons want to allow other religions to be a potent force in being equated to or above politics outside appeals to natural law, reason or a tradition of rights. We are in the minority and need the protection against other religions as a political force.
Comment by Martin James — March 18, 2016 @ 4:26 pm
“Although Hegel may be wrong on the morals, he sure seems more accurate about the history which always seems to be an evolving mash-up rather than a clear choice.”
I agree that Kierkegaard seems (I haven’t read enough to fully unpack his views on this subject) a little ahistorical for my taste. That said, I see this historicity in far more Darwinian terms than Hegelian ones such that a dialectical struggle for distinction from alternatives drives history more than any striving for a “higher” synthesis. It is for this reason that a Kierkegaardian choice still remains, even if the options themselves are not static.
I plan on writing a few posts of Bourdieu in the next couple weeks where I should have more to say on the importance of distinction.
Comment by Jeff G — March 18, 2016 @ 4:40 pm
As you know I dislike both Hegel and Kierkegaard. They both do have points to them though. I like the Hegel of the Phenomenology much better (even if I don’t buy the master/slave metaphor).
That said a way to read Hegel that is a tad more palatable is to see the synthesis as much more of a creative drive to discover new truths outside of the system. To give an obvious contemporary example QM and GR conflict so we assume there is missing data that will give us a theory that explains both and is more accurate. This theory making cant be the kind of science generalizing from the data we have along with the two paradigms. Instead a creative drive must speculate in a productive fashion.
Comment by Clark — March 18, 2016 @ 9:20 pm
“To give an obvious contemporary example QM and GR conflict so we assume there is missing data that will give us a theory that explains both and is more accurate.”
I guess. But coming up with a third, more universal theory does not mean that it is a synthesis of those that came before. Instead, it is simply the addition of a third theory which has it’s own set of costs and benefits associated with its use. Consider GR and Newtonian mechanics. Merely coming up with a more universal theory did not preclude the continued teaching and use of Newton.
Of course, I am deeply suspicious of any attempt to model our social lives on physics. (If anything, I think our understanding of physical theories should be modeled on our social lives rather than the other way around.) Furthermore, I couldn’t care less whether a grand unified theory is found or not. I simply do not see how it is relevant to my life… but that’s a bit off topic.
Comment by Jeff G — March 19, 2016 @ 12:43 pm
Interesting thoughts, Jeff. The nice thing about Hegel is he gives a framework for thinking about change over time. So few philosophies provide that sort of developmental view. Consider Kierkegaard’s categories — I imagine our idea of what the aesthetic, the rational, and the religious way of living means is different from what K thought about them. I don’t think faith and reason as some sort of mixture spurs the change. Change over time seems to happen under its own intertia. But reason and reflection certainly helps us understand (to a degree) what has happened. As Hegel said, the owl of Minerva doesn’t lead the parade.
Comment by Dave — March 19, 2016 @ 1:09 pm
I largely agree, Dave. I think the struggle for distinction and purification are at least as important as any longing for synthesis or integration… Especially as one conceptually frames the relationship between Zion and Babylon.
Comment by Jeff G — March 19, 2016 @ 1:53 pm
Jeff a misunderstanding of Hegel is the assumption there weren’t real contradictions as errors. The way he intends things in his Logic (written fairly soon after the Phenomenology) to my eyes is much more about apparent contradictions that disappear as our understanding expands.
That said the way Hegel gets used sometimes does fall prey to what you outline.
I should add that I think it is a pretty common Mormon view that if we had deeper understanding many apparent problems would disappear. The danger is in assuming some problems due to beliefs mean we can hold contradictory beliefs. Sometimes contradictions are only apparent, as with GR/QM. Sometimes they are inherent as with Young Earth Creationism and scientific dating.
Comment by Clark — March 21, 2016 @ 10:12 am
To add, I think the real divide between Kierkegaard and Hegel is much more the battle between the radical particular versus the more social. Hegel’s conception of ethics is in many ways fairly Spinozan. That is it’s tied to the evolution of the whole in terms of politics and the social. Kierkegaard thinks (with a fair bit of justification) that this misses something fundamental in the individual. For Hegel morality is wrapped up with mediation in the sense of the social. (Even if Hegel moves this along more metaphysical lines – although I’ll fully confess my knowledge of the nuances of Hegel’s thought is lacking)
My own view that you need a kind of double move that includes both Hegel notion of the social and mediation along with Kierkegaard’s recognition of a kind of radically individual experience, choice and demand. (You see, I think, Levinas moving more in this direction with his recognition of the demand of the Other to us phenomenologically with a kind of social engagement where we seek to avoid violence to the other)
Comment by Clark — March 21, 2016 @ 10:18 am
“Sometimes contradictions are only apparent, as with GR/QM. Sometimes they are inherent as with Young Earth Creationism and scientific dating.”
I can’t help but see all such appeals to “apparent contradictions” as ideological evasions of choice and responsibility. Since we can never get beyond the appearance/reality divide, the appeal to the former is far too readily available at pretty much any time.
This is not to say that I think one must choose, once and forever between Einstein and Newton or anything like that… but it does involve demoting at least one of these (I say both) from the status of binding truth.
It is because of cheap moves like “apparent contradictions” that I insist on sociologically cashing out the practical, social effects of truth/falsehood.
Comment by Jeff G — March 21, 2016 @ 10:55 am
Well, I think the “appearance” divide is more an artifact of Kant. I tend to agree with Hegel against Kant in that regard. How much that matters in practice though I’m less sure about. It’s just the case that we’re sometimes wrong and often have limited data. I’m not sure that more epistemological condition should lead to a big appearance/reality divide.
I’m not quite sure what one means by “binding truth.” However I do think our fallibilism ought inform how we act towards truth claims.
Comment by Clark — March 21, 2016 @ 11:31 am
I’m much closer to Fichte’s (and Rorty’s) totally rejection of “reality” as something that exists independent of “appearance”. The idea that reality stands in any position to correct our beliefs independent of our social context is nonsense to me.
We must always consult our shared vocabularies concerning which claim are, as a matter of social fact, prescribed, prohibited or open at any given time. The science community currently wants to say that Darwin, to take a perfect example, is prescriptive in a morally binding sense upon us. Our current LDS leaders, by contrast, typically try to morally enforce an “openness” which stands in stark opposition to:
1) the attitude that scientists currently prescribe us to take on Darwin (they do not tolerate such an “openness”),
2) the current attitude that LDS leaders prescribe us to take on other religious issues and
3) the past attitude that Brigham Young, among others, prohibited members from taking on Darwin (which was very much bound up with the social morality of the united order).
As things stand, both LDS leaders and scientists encourage (or at least, in the former case, tolerate) further inquiry on the Darwinian question…. but there is nothing timeless or universal about this encouragement. The socio-historical nature which I attribute to our prescribing, prohibiting and leaving open the practice of inquiry on any given issue can hardly be called “fallibilism” in any deep sense. Sometimes god says “trouble your mind no more” on some issue. Sometimes the scientific community ostracizes people for doing various kinds of research (which they so flippantly dismiss as “pseudo-science”).
I thus find “fallibilism” to be a naive model of inquiry in any descriptive or prescriptive sense.
Comment by Jeff G — March 21, 2016 @ 11:53 am
“The science community currently wants to say that Darwin, to take a perfect example, is prescriptive in a morally binding sense upon us.”
I’d like to see some examples of the science community that says “moral position X is binding because…darwin.”
Comment by Martin James — March 21, 2016 @ 12:10 pm
Well I don’t think a reality/appearance distinction is helpful. (This was a way Fichte was moving away from Kant even though he’s basically a Kantian) As you know I’m much more about the more pragmatic position of reality/experience including appearances.
I’m honestly not sure what it means to say Darwin is “prescriptive in a morally binding sense.” Even in biology science has moved on quite a bit from where Darwin was in the mid-19th century.
Comment by Clark — March 21, 2016 @ 12:55 pm
It shocks me that you guys aren’t willing to grant that the affirmation of Darwin is not morally enforced within the west. To be sure, scientists won’t use the word “moral” since they pretend to neutrality, but all the stigmatization and marginalization that functions as moral enforcement is quite obviously at play, both within and without the relevant disciplines.
Those who do not align themselves properly with Darwin are dismissed as “not serious” scientists who other scientists will distance themselves from. Those texts which include anti-Darwinian sentiments are strongly stigmatized at all level of academia – sometimes legally so. People who doubt Darwin are dismissed as uninformed, irrational or otherwise unenlightened. Indeed, Darwin has even become a political test for presidential candidates. You might wish that Darwin was not subject to such moral regulation, but like it or not, he is.
If, however, such things do not count as “moral” enforcement, then you probably mean something very different than I do by that word – probably something that has no practical relevance, thus leading me to reject it altogether. If somebody is systematically excluded from various benefits and social standings because solely they said X, then by what reasoning could we ever said that X is not morally enforced?
Comment by Jeff G — March 21, 2016 @ 1:12 pm
One need look no further than the most recent post at FPR for a typical illustration of the moral enforcement of academic consensus and prestige.
Comment by Jeff G — March 21, 2016 @ 1:21 pm
“If, however, such things do not count as “moral” enforcement, then you probably mean something very different than I do by that word – probably something that has no practical relevance, thus leading me to reject it altogether”
I think it cuts exactly the other way. Belief or non-belief in Darwinism rules out no practically relevant behavior.
Comment by Martin James — March 21, 2016 @ 3:41 pm
Furthermore, people who take darwinism too seriously seem to be the most despised of all in science.
Comment by Martin James — March 21, 2016 @ 3:42 pm
“academic” and “relevance” are opposites.
Comment by Martin James — March 21, 2016 @ 3:42 pm
Not only did your comment not provide any examples of or support for your assertions, it failed to address the examples that I provided.
Darwin is legally prescribed in school curriculum while his detractors are legally banned from it. That’s about as open and shut as it gets.
Comment by Jeff G — March 21, 2016 @ 3:54 pm
Feel free to look up any comment in the bloggernacle that pushes back against Darwin and judge the responses for yourself.
There is an embarrassment of riches in my side here.
Comment by Jeff G — March 21, 2016 @ 3:58 pm
What if you were using Darwin to show that that homosexuality didn’t exist?
Comment by Martin James — March 21, 2016 @ 4:08 pm
So algebra is morally prescribed on us also?
You are always trying to prescribe standards of evidence and assertions. I think you are projecting.
Comment by Martin James — March 21, 2016 @ 4:23 pm
My point is just that the Darwinism isn’t doing the moral work. It may be the result of a moral process however.
Comment by Martin James — March 21, 2016 @ 4:49 pm
Nobody is claiming that Darwin is doing any moral work.
And, yes, algebra is morally enforced. See what happens when you repeatedly and publicly cast doubt on it if you don’t believe me. Mockery and marginalization are sure to follow.
Comment by Jeff G — March 21, 2016 @ 5:26 pm
Normative recognition isn’t necessarily moral enforcement, is it? If I think you’re unable to think normally it’s not enforcing morals so much as a distrust of an inability to reason. The reason we fear the insane is because they aren’t reasoning in a predictable fashion. Someone who violates what we hold as rational is untrustworthy. I’m not sure that’s moral so much.
I suppose though this is really a minor semantic quibble over what “moral” means. If wrong in any sense is moral, then you’re right of course. But it seems like how we view murder is different from how we view say a schizophrenic. The latter generally isn’t seen as immoral even if their connection to reality is lost in some ways.
Comment by Clark — March 21, 2016 @ 9:15 pm
“If I think you’re unable to think normally it’s not enforcing morals so much as a distrust of an inability to reason.”
How is this any different from those who “don’t have enough self-control” or “lack moral fiber”, etc.? When punishment and stigmatization follow such “recognitions it’s called moral enforcement.
Comment by Jeff G — March 21, 2016 @ 10:40 pm
Is there any social process that isn’t moral for you?
But tell people that they should base their decisions on an explicit mathematical model and you know what happens? Mockery and marginalization are sure to follow.
Comment by Martin James — March 22, 2016 @ 7:52 am
I think I misunderstood you if your only point is that there are social forces including the science community that has the power to determine an education curriculum and also social sanction in certain areas then I agree with you.
I just don’t think that the science communities power extends that far. Just trying running for office in a rural southern county on a pro-evolution platform. Or look at how ineffective that process is when large segments of the public claim not to believe in evolution.
Comment by Martin James — March 22, 2016 @ 7:58 am
“Is there any social process that isn’t moral for you?”
No.
“But tell people that they should base their decisions on an explicit mathematical model and you know what happens? Mockery and marginalization are sure to follow.”
You’re right. That’s morally regulated as well.
“I just don’t think that the science communities power extends that far.”
I wasn’t really focused on the scientific communities hegemony over the rest of us. Rather, I was simply saying giving Darwin as a example of an example of morally regulated speech both inside and outside its respective community. Whether it is this community alone that wields the power is largely irrelevant.
Comment by Jeff G — March 22, 2016 @ 8:10 am
To elaborate a bit, just because I believe that all social interaction is morally regulated, this does not mean that the moral regulations are fully determinate in each social context. There is plenty of ambiguity, transition, contestation and dynamic flux in the process.
The closest that I can imagine to a non-moral situation would be Hobbes’ state of nature in which case localized moralities would quickly and spontaneously emerge.
Comment by Jeff G — March 22, 2016 @ 8:12 am
“There is plenty of ambiguity, transition, contestation and dynamic flux in the process.”
And what best explains the changes in context over time?
Comment by Martin James — March 22, 2016 @ 9:31 am
I assume you’re asking about the change in moral regulations (right?).
There is no simple answer to this question. I’m putting together a series on Bourdieu and his attempt at (partially) answering that question.
Of course, this is just a non-binding (“optional” might be another word for it) model of how moralities overlap and interact with each other. If we want to discuss “true” morality, then we have to accept our own situated-ness within one of these traditions that are being modeled. It is in this sense that every person will see the moral rules which they are both subject to and actively enforce as the “true” ones.
What we, as Mormons, want to say, however, is that all people are subject to the morality which God Himself enforces – or at least will one day enforce in the final and universal judgment. In other words, we believe that everybody will kneel and confess themselves subject to this one, particular morality in which Jesus is the Christ.
In the words of Section 19, eternal moral law is God’s moral law because His name is “Eternal”, etc. The moral law is no more and no less timeless and unchanging than the punishment which structures it. Indeed, these two concepts (morality and punishment) are mutually defining such that it makes no sense to speak of one without the other. It is for this reason that the punishments (be they active or passive) associated with denying Darwin or algebra just are moral in nature.
Comment by Jeff G — March 22, 2016 @ 10:26 am
What makes a punishment a punishment?
Comment by Martin James — March 22, 2016 @ 10:53 am
I’m sure whatever definition you come up with will do just fine. If somebody doesn’t view being put through hell fire and damnation as a punishment, then they must not be human in any sense that I would recognize.
Comment by Jeff G — March 22, 2016 @ 11:26 am
From my perspective you are stuck in a bit of a time warp where there is something other than an anarchy of morals. We are in a state of nature morally in that there is no clear authoritative structure. Trump is re-writing social sanction rules, Putin protects Snowden, terrorists extract proxy punishment, Pope Francis attacks capitalism, Arab Spring revolutions and counter revolutions, North Korean demonstrations of the ability to punish, Chinese projection of power in South China Sea, rise of the religiously unaffiliated in the West, divided Supreme Court, Apple fighting with DOJ, etc. The class structure that Bourdieu wrote about is a smaller and smaller part of the world. I believe we are less and less situated morally and hence there is no longer punishment, just violence and insult.
Comment by Martin James — March 22, 2016 @ 11:58 am
“If somebody doesn’t view being put through hell fire and damnation as a punishment”
But one doesn’t get hell fire and damnation for disrespecting algebra and evolution.
Comment by Martin James — March 22, 2016 @ 12:01 pm
Violence and insults are most definitely kinds of moral enforcement. What you’re objecting to is a fragmentation of the moral community… and I definitely worry about that too. Of course, just like Hobbes said, each moral community sees all the others as the problem and that their own (and theirs alone!) moral conscience is the key to peace.
“But one doesn’t get hell fire and damnation for disrespecting algebra and evolution.”
Seriously? What’s that even supposed to prove? Do you really expect me to change any part of my position based on that?
Comment by Jeff G — March 22, 2016 @ 12:13 pm
“Seriously? What’s that even supposed to prove? Do you really expect me to change any part of my position based on that?”
Of course.
Comment by Martin James — March 22, 2016 @ 12:31 pm
Its always about the money.
Comment by Martin James — March 22, 2016 @ 12:35 pm
You lost me. No clue what or who you’re talking about.
Comment by Jeff G — March 22, 2016 @ 2:52 pm
Came back to think about this some more. Ignoring the whole side question of when something is ethics enforcement, I’m curious as to where you are going with this. It sounds like in your distrust of reason (broadly conceived socially) you want a kind of Kierkegaard “knight of faith” that simply ignores everything outside of its faith.
My problem with this of course is that to have faith one must first have an understanding in what one has faith. Further there’s always a certain feedback since to act in faith produces results which affects faith. (Alma 32 being the classic metaphor for this move of grace for grace) I suspect you recognize this feedback which is why you see things as “halfway” between K & H.
Now I have a lot of problems with Hegel which I won’t go into. Peirce is effectively a Hegelian who thinks things through much better and recognizes more of a place for chance than Hegel (who sees things in terms of necessity). I’m just not sure this is as at odds with true faith as you suggest. My problem with Kierkegaard has long been that he seems to offer a counterfeit of faith.
Comment by Clark — March 23, 2016 @ 12:30 pm