Tokens and Signs vs. Evidence and Reason
The story of Adam and Eve is about as anti-intellectual as they come.
When confronted by teachers they did not ask for evidence or reasoned justifications that might support an abstract proposition or truth. Instead, they asked for simple signs, tokens and other indicators that the teacher (rather than their message) was authorized by God. Indeed, they essentially ignored those people that could offer nothing more than scriptures or philosophical reasoning and seemed pretty uninterested in the explanation or justification for those things that they actually did accept as binding upon them.
Whatever we might call this approach to the gospel, it is not apologetics or systematic theology – approaches that basically agree with Lucifer in thinking that the (scriptural) evidence and (philosophical) reasons for a teaching have anything to do with the authority of the teacher.
Edit: It’s also worth pointing out that when Adam and Eve finally did get an explanation for the sacrifices they had been performing, the explanation was simply the declaration of an unobservable (even in principle) purpose or meaning.
I was thinking of this exchange as well. Very interesting and fitting.
Comment by Eric Nielson — June 18, 2015 @ 3:36 am
Isn’t asking for credentials (in this case, signs and tokens) a universal way in which one person or group knows that someone has been sent by another person or group? Sometimes in spy movies the code will be in the form of a cryptic statement that only a “true” messenger would know. It is implied in the Adam and Eve story that you are referring to, that the codes transmitted to Adam and Eve could only come from Heaven. If that’s the case, there really is no reason for “evidence or reasoned justifications”. Once the transaction of signs and tokens takes place, what the messenger says will have come from God in the same way the spy will know that that messenger’s words came from “headquarters”.
Comment by larryco_ — June 18, 2015 @ 3:42 am
I think it really comes down to what kinds of signs or tokens count as evidence and how human beings recognize them. Out of curiousity what do you make of spirit, soul and body? How does one know what kind of experience one is having?
Comment by Martin James — June 18, 2015 @ 8:48 am
So are signs and tokens empirical?
Comment by Martin James — June 18, 2015 @ 8:57 am
Tokens = evidence. For evidence to act as evidence it has to function as a token within a sign.
Comment by Clark — June 18, 2015 @ 11:02 am
Clark and Martin,
It is certainly not evidence in any straightforward, empirical sense. Tokens and signs are like a robe, throne or scepter in that they are symbols and indicators of a person’s (not a position) legitimate authority. Such things may be construed as evidence for a person’s authority, but this is completely different from sidelining questions of authority in order to approach teachings independent of the teacher. In other words, signs and tokens provide zero evidence whatsoever for any teaching, even if they do provide evidence for a teacher.
I’m thinking that maybe “argument” would be a better word than “reason” for what I am pushing back against. Hopefully the former is not as closely associated with cognitive process in general and focuses more attention on the ways in which we (in)validate claims.
Martin,
Hopefully this shift from reason to argumentation illustrates how little relevance I see in the nature of “experience.” I do not care how experience is characterized. What I do care about is how or if experience or empirical data is used to support or undermine teachings, and this is not something that is just given.
Comment by Jeff G — June 18, 2015 @ 11:23 am
Just to expand a bit, the difference in the type of evidence that signs and token provide can be viewed in terms of apologetics: Imagine that an apologist simply quoted a church leader and then provided evidence that the leader had in fact been ordained to their position (ordination date, witnesses, testimonies, etc.). Yes, such things are evidence of sorts, but they are definitely not evidence or direct support for the teaching in question.
This is exactly the danger that I see in the constant repetition of the fallibility of our leaders: such claims are specifically aimed to taking attention away from the signs, tokens and the authority of the teacher entirely in order to refocus attention on the teaching itself and the justifications that can be brought for or against it. But such peer review is the exact opposite of what the gospel calls for.
John Dewey, John Stuart Mill and other such participatory democrats thought that the more voices and arguments that went into a decision the better. This, however, is the exact opposite of the church’s teachings that the more voices that go into a decision, the more the pure voice of the Lord gets diluted and polluted. This is why evidence and argument do not belong in the church.
Comment by Jeff G — June 18, 2015 @ 11:49 am
Jeff,
Just as a reminder, I’m trying to push your locus of concern to those that are in good faith trying to figure out how to understand how to be and how to carry out authority in our times.
Your main concern is to open up an alternative path to those that think reason (or argument) is the preferred rationality and without an alternative framework will gradually (or suddenly) leave the church. You have told me that people have told you your work helps them. Good on you and them for that.
My concern is with what I believe to be larger group of people who struggle with what it means to be in the world but not of the world. I think this is a much more complicated experience than your historical division of types of authority and that the battles you win with keeping people from scientism may be lost on people have a bifurcated worldview in terms of religious meaning and everyday meaning. I think this is both unfortunate and unnecessary.
My concern is as much with the people who leave the church for fundamentalist mormonism or the critiques of authority of people like Denver Snuffer. These people are not under the spell of scientism they are confused about what the signs of authority are.
I’m just not that sure that telling them authority is truth, so follow authority is that helpful in the face of people questioning where authority comes from. One could say, well, if the spirit leads them to other authority, godspeed to them.
I’m just trying to help you think through and round out an approach that works for many more people in many more circumstances. My main attempt to get you to see that people can misunderstand authority while acting in good faith. Jettboy may be right that it’s only the wicked that make things complicated but the people having trouble with authority from both a modern reason and a yearning for past interpretations don’t seem to me to be particularly more righteous or wicked on average than those that stay in the church. I’m pushing you to make your thought less of an “easy answer” and more of a complete answer as a way of covering more cases.
It’s hard for all of us not to fall in love with one approach that has helped us but I admire the work you are putting into it and I have learned from it.
Comment by Martin James — June 18, 2015 @ 11:55 am
Perhaps this is a good tack to focus on since I do have opinions here. I think that the timeless uniformity without any regard for stewardship is the greatest fuel for fundamentalists. Such people hear about all these teachings from dead prophets who were more willing to say “Thus saith the Lord…” and they feel at least as much an obligation to these dead prophets as they do to the living ones. This is EXACTLY the line of reasoning that I am trying to tear down. These people assume that JS and BY continue to have stewardship over us that can compete with or even trump that of the living prophet and this is absolutely wrong.
On the other hand, like you say, if the spirit prompts people to follow that different path, then it is absolutely right for them to follow that Higher Authority. What church members (both mainstream and fundamentalist) tend to get wrong, however, is that if God tells them such and such, then He couldn’t possibly tell those other people something different and contradictory. Again, this is what I am fighting against. God doesn’t give me access to yours, Pres. Monson’s or anybody else’s revelation, but instead gives me my own revelation to follow.
I agree. I think the biggest hang up (at least between Clark and I) is that the Adam and Eve story can be framed in different ways. One way (Clark’s I’m guessing) is that tokens and signs do provide evidence that we should follow some teacher – or at least that the burden of proof is on the naysayer …. but this does not mean that the naysayer cannot ever use evidence and argumentation to trump that teacher. This was actually the position that I started off with in my earlier posts.
I no longer find that position viable, however, since that position clings to what is actually a radical transformation in the nature of truth and the rules that constrain how teachings and claims are (de)legitimzed. This position is really an attempt to reduce the legitimacy of persons to that of positions rather than the other way around. In other words, it takes the wrong side of the Euthyphro dilemma and in so doing opens the door wide open for human teachings and human values to trump the teachings and values of the Lord. I also think that the scriptures strongly push back against the idea that human reason – no matter how rigorous – is ever qualified to trump a righteous prophet. Evidence and argument are cheap substitutes – additional obstacles rather convenient shortcuts – for the only thing that ought to constrain our obedience to a righteous prophet: our relationship with God Himself.
Another useful way of construing the difference would be the debate between Popper and Kuhn regarding the demarcation of science. Popper’s position was that of an “open society” in which each and every person was fully authorized to criticize or falsify scientists since what counted and valid science had no relation whatsoever to who was speaking. Kuhn, on the other hand, said that the difference between what is and is not science is determined by the scientists. By this he did not mean that, practically speaking, scientists are simply in a better position to recognize the impersonal reason for judging as they did. On the contrary, he said that the difference between valid and non-science ultimately boils down to who is doing the speaking rather than what is actually spoken. In other words, Kuhn advocated a “closed society” for scientists.
I see a priesthood organization as being a fundamentally closed society of which we are voluntarily a part.
Comment by Jeff G — June 18, 2015 @ 12:41 pm
Jeff, I’m uncomfortable with getting too specific here. I think we have to remember that we’re dealing with ritual with multiple layers. The part you were referring to can’t be easily divorced from that context. (Think about who shows up and what they’re physical status would be according to our theology in terms of presenting the tokens in question)
In any case they are normal evidence for authority. So for instance prior to fast communication an ambassador or other representative from a country/power has to be able to demonstrate that they are in fact who they claim to be.
It goes even further than that if we think of the masonic symbols in their original (pre-renaissance masonic) context. There you had guilds where they were building cathedrals and other such things around Europe. Workers would appear and there had to be a way they could demonstrate to other workers/managers that they were who they claimed to be in terms of that trade.
Secret passwords and the like were common even in the 20th century for spies in the Cold War. So these processes were fairly well known and still can be useful.
However we have to make a distinction between evidence for someone being an authority and then what that authority allows them to do. Again as a practical matter this happens a lot. There are various strategies and techniques for dealing with this in the ancient world where communication was difficult and you typically had illiterate populations. (Think of the complexities, for instance, of dealing with military commands in the early modern era)
Comment by Clark — June 18, 2015 @ 12:52 pm
Jeff,
“On the other hand, like you say, if the spirit prompts people to follow that different path, then it is absolutely right for them to follow that Higher Authority. What church members (both mainstream and fundamentalist) tend to get wrong, however, is that if God tells them such and such, then He couldn’t possibly tell those other people something different and contradictory. Again, this is what I am fighting against. God doesn’t give me access to yours, Pres. Monson’s or anybody else’s revelation, but instead gives me my own revelation to follow.”
So here is what confuses me. Is this statement just true based on revelation to you or is it true for everyone? There seems to me to be a conflict where you want the place of authority to be a constant as the authorities change and what they say changes. What is it that makes this the case? Do you believe it because the authorities with stewardship over you are saying it and if they said otherwise then you wouldn’t say it? or do you believe it for other reasons?
Comment by Martin James — June 18, 2015 @ 1:22 pm
“However we have to make a distinction between evidence for someone being an authority and then what that authority allows them to do.”
This was the whole point of the post.
Mostly, I was playing on the often commented “Do you have any evidence?” and the real question “Do you have any signs, tokens or authority?” (Of course, I do not have any authority, so it makes perfect sense for bloggers to ask me for evidence.) No amount of argument or evidence will give you authority and once somebody establishes authority, they have no need for evidence or argument. In either case, the philosophies of men and scriptural proof-texts have no place in the doctrinal truths/falsehoods we have an obligation to accept/reject.
Comment by Jeff G — June 18, 2015 @ 1:25 pm
Martin,
These are good questions.
“Is this statement just true based on revelation to you or is it true for everyone?”
I think authority provide moral boundaries to behaviors, speech acts and beliefs. There are two boundaries in particular that concern me: the inner most boundary contains those (true) things that we are morally obligated to do, affirm, believe, etc. Outside of the second boundary lie those (false) things that we are morally obligated to disavow, refrain from, deny, etc. Between these two boundaries, however, lies a large area in which a great deal of diversity, plurality and creativity is tolerated, if not actively encouraged (this middle ground is where science falls, ideally). I call this middle ground “useful” and it is within this middle ground that I hope my model falls as far as other people go – since I have no moral authority over them whatsoever.
“There seems to me to be a conflict where you want the place of authority to be a constant as the authorities change and what they say changes.”
I don’t see any tension at all. There is only a tension if one presupposes that truth itself is an static and uniform universal that is not adapted to different people’s and contexts that shifts in moral boundaries (the law of Moses, consecration, blood sacrifice, polygamy, word of wisdom, etc.) that there is an issue. But since Truth is a living person rather than a dead proposition, I see no reason to accept that.
With regards to me in particular, I honestly think that the morality that I describe is that which we find in scripture and makes the most sense of what we are taught today in the church. Furthermore, the modern view that is so popular now is, quite obviously, NOT what is found in scripture since it was invented so recently and for such secular reasons. While I do think that contemporary church leaders suggest various aspects of my model, I think it is based much more in sociological reasoning than anything else. This is why I think it is merely useful (since it doesn’t contradict living authorities either) rather than true and binding.
Comment by Jeff G — June 18, 2015 @ 1:47 pm
I’m still sick so I don’t want to say too much.
I’d just say that I don’t think my position involves trumps. I’m arguing that we reject that way of thinking and instead use hermeneutics where we’re balancing many types of evidence, authority being one of them with a lot of weight. But part of acknowledging authority is acknowledging it is *human* authority. (Granted divinely, but still it’s a human with that authority) That means fallibilism and thus makes things slightly more complex.
Comment by Clark — June 19, 2015 @ 8:48 pm
To add I think this position of mine completely takes care of the Denver Snuffer issue. 1. He doesn’t have authority even the way Joseph taught it. (At least the apostates in the 1920’s claimed authority by way of second anointings – he claims he got it directly from God as I recall) 2. His history of events in Church history are just plain bad. 3. His positions don’t make a lot of sense. 4. He contradicts authorities I have trust in and that I grant as having authority for spiritual reasons. Therefore to accord him much weight I’d need a lot of extra evidence which isn’t forthcoming.
This means I can reject him independent of an explicit revelation on the subject and without creating a trump for authority which raises its own problems.
Comment by Clark — June 19, 2015 @ 8:52 pm
Why? My whole argument is that it does NOT make it more complicated and that the idea that it does was invented during the Enlightenment. The scriptures certainly gives no indication that the mortality of an authority is at all relevant to the legitimacy of their teachings – only their moral purity.
With regard to Snuffer, his history and the fact that he contradicts other teaching or any other kind of “evidence” is totally irrelevant. These methods of vetting prophets are totally based in human made substitutes and thus subversions of personal revelation that were the hallmarks of the great apostasy (I’m thinking of Nibley’s The World and the Prophets).
After all, JS taught doctrine and histories that were also “bad” or “contradictory” to many, but that didn’t change the fact that we was ordained and that the Lord told various people to follow him, regardless of what any evidence might have suggested. (I totally reject the idea that divine guidance is “evidence” in the sense of provide impersonal data that confirms some position.)
Comment by Jeff G — June 22, 2015 @ 2:30 pm
1. Testing prophets has a fairly robust history in the scriptures. So I’m not sure why you discount this.
2. Joseph Smith was pretty explicit that a prophet is only a prophet when acting as such. Thus it’s not as clear as you suggest. We have to find out when he’s acting as a prophet. (You might discount that as that quote of Joseph never made it into scripture of course)
3. The mortality of prophets is also an issue in scripture. I take Ether 12 to be about the weakness of writing but that with the Holy Ghost we can get to what was intended. Problem is again what to do when you don’t have personal revelation on a subject (and I’d add the issue of interpreting personal revelation)
Comment by Clark — June 23, 2015 @ 8:42 am
1. Of course we are supposed to test the prophets, just as my model suggests. What the scriptures never say, however, is that we ought to test their teachings by argument or objective/observable evidence. We are never testing propositions at all, really,only our trust in another person, and the clearest way that we have been given to test prophets is by way of signs and tokens.
2. Okay, but what does that quote have to do with fallibility? Just because a priesthood leader has stewardship over me, does not mean that every single thing that ever comes out of his mouth is binding upon me…. Only those things that he says officially as a prophet, aka priesthood holder. The connection between this quote and fallibility seems rather contrived to me (I know you personally aren’t the one who contrived it.)
Yes, when speaking officially a prophet is still fallible, but we never read that this automatically places us in a position to critique and evaluate them with evidence and arguments. Only personal revelation can lead us away from prophetic teachings, even if they are fallible. Just as we are sometimes commanded to depart from fully prophetic revelations, we are also sometimes commanded to adhere to prophetic opinions. Again, there is no strong link that fallibility might break between our obligation to a prophet and their perfectly interpreted access to revelation. None that I can clearly find in the scripture anyways.
3. That’s easy, follow the living prophet since it is only personal revelation that keeps something else (human reasoning) from corrupting the church. It is also worth mentioning that I think true religion in essentially oral in nature with its contextual openness to impromptu inspiration (that even the speaker may not recognize as such) and that the written words of prophets are a practically necessary and in many way beneficial evil. Dead texts are even worse that dead prophets in that they were never ordained to anything and thus do not in themselves have any authority over us. Like science, the written words of dead prophets can be very beneficial, but outside of the legitimizing authority that a living prophet bring to them (or science) we are their moral masters rather than their moral slaves.
Comment by Jeff G — June 23, 2015 @ 12:42 pm
So what do you make of the texts on LDS.org like this one?
https://www.lds.org/topics/environmental-stewardship-and-conservation?lang=eng&query=stewardship
What are they in terms of authority? What kind of legitimacy do they have? By what process do we understand them?
The earth also teaches us. We can learn, for example, the laws, principles, and patterns by which it functions (see D&C 88:42-47).
However, all are stewards—not owners—over this earth and its bounty and will be accountable before God for what they do with His creations (see D&C 104:13–15). All humankind should gratefully use what God has given, avoid wasting life and resources, and use the bounty of the earth to care for the poor and the needy (see D&C 49:19-21).
Comment by Martin James — June 23, 2015 @ 12:43 pm
Martin,
I don’t see how any of that article is counter to anything I’ve suggested. I’ve never even insinuated that we had nothing to learn from the earth and I’ve been very clear that each of us has some stewardship in this life. (I have actually wanted to explore the relationship and differences between stewardship and property for a while and that passage makes for a decent proof-text.)
As for documents that are published like that, I see them as having a tacit endorsement of the 15 Apostles. For this reason, I’m not totally sure at this time which of the following is right:
1) Inasmuch as they go beyond what the 15 have actually said, they are meant as words of wisdom for our edification.
or
2) Inasmuch as they do not contradict what the 15 have actually said, they should be treated as having been endorsed by the 15 and thus are binding upon us (unless personal revelation tells us otherwise).
At this time, I am more inclined toward the 1st since I am a little uncomfortable with equating explicit and specific endorsement with tacit and blanket endorsement of so many unordained authors.
Comment by Jeff G — June 23, 2015 @ 1:08 pm
In other words, I think we have an obligation of sorts to read such publications, but not necessarily to accept each and every word as prophetically binding upon us. Rather, such articles help to bring the words of the prophets to mind and to function as a catalyst for personal revelation.
In other words, I see such articles in the same way that I do a sacrament talk or a opening devotional prior to institute class when such things are not corrected by the presiding leader.
Comment by Jeff G — June 23, 2015 @ 1:21 pm
Martin again,
I’ve been thinking a little bit more about ways in which my model is open to refutation. I see three main points at which I am exposed to refutation:
1) If a higher authority contradicts my model, by my own logic we ought to reject it.
2) (This is a weak one.) Since my model in largely sociological in nature, I am pretty exposed to a sociological refutation. This would not refute my model by its own logic, but it would prevent others – to some extent – from buying into in the first place for sociological reasons.
3) My model says that teachings and truths can vary tremendously across the contexts of differing stewardships. (This is a fusion of sorts between a kind of traditional belief in hierarchy and a counter-enlightenment romanticism.) The question is: can the connection between the legitimacy of teachings and stewardship itself be something that varies across context? Might a priesthood leader (God) reveal that priesthood stewardship is no longer relevant? I am convinced that it does not, but this is a point at which I am exposed.
I still do not see how interpretation is a problem though.
Edit: I also find it interesting that the potential problems (1) and (2) are totally unrelated in my model. My model might be fully justified from a sociological perspective, but priesthood authorities might rule it out all the same. It might also violate everything we know from sociology and the leader might still teach it as binding upon us. This difference is itself quite unique.
Comment by Jeff G — June 23, 2015 @ 2:01 pm
When I think about the exchange that Adam and Eve had with the messengers, I couldn’t help but notice a couple of things as it relates to your points Jeff.
First, the messengers came 2 times. In the first visit they observed the goings-on. They were still messengers; they had stewardship, communicated with Adam and Eve, etc. But they hadn’t been directly charged with delivering a message yet, so they let Adam worship God without hindering the process or telling him what kind of rocks he should build the alter with or what words he should use to pray with. The second time they were given instructions to relay, which they did.
What does this necessarily mean? Well, we have to have a certain level of trust in our leaders that they aren’t delivering a message that they weren’t charged with carrying out, and they have to have the humility to recognize that themselves. We in turn recognize that they are true messengers and have special instructions to relay.
If this pattern is not being followed, then what is really going on?
Your example makes a great case for authority, something that all LDS have to accept (and most don’t have a problem with it). But there is always more nuance that will come up.
Comment by Pierce — June 23, 2015 @ 2:24 pm
“If this pattern is not being followed, then what is really going on?”
What is always going on: working the immortality and eternal life of man. Sometimes that’s the people to whom the message is being delivered….sometimes that’s the immortality and eternal life of the deliverers.
That’s why Christ is so central. So long as you believe in His atonement covering all sin and error, we are free to be patient as imperfect mortals try to carry out His will. After all, that is the way He has chosen to accomplish His work.
Comment by SilverRain — June 23, 2015 @ 2:38 pm
SilverRain I completely agree with you, but sometimes the culture in the church detracts from that sentiment–the result seems to be that time and attention is focused on posturing of authority, prophets, true church, commandments that aren’t really commandments, etc.
I’m with you about being patient, as I also am one of the imperfect mortals trying to carry out His will.
Comment by Pierce — June 23, 2015 @ 2:53 pm
Pierce,
“What does this necessarily mean?”
It means, as Clark quoted, that a prophet is only a prophet when acting as such. That quote has nothing to do with fallibility, only the appropriate limits on stewardship. When ordained leaders present themselves “officially” or speak as a leader rather than as “Bro. So and So who gave me advice on the stock market” we have an obligation to listen to them.
Since P,J&J did not present themselves officially, there was nothing for A&E to follow. Once they did identify themselves as official leaders, all questions of evidence, arguments, interpretations, fallibility in relaying the message, etc. were totally beside the point. All that mattered was that they were duly ordained and that they were righteous.
Comment by Jeff G — June 23, 2015 @ 2:53 pm
Promise to get back to things, but I think part of the problem is not just in prophetic fallibilism which you seem to downplay too much but also the interpretive issue of when a prophet is a prophet. You assert that the prophet always identified themselves as acting as such but I don’t see that. Consider Pres. Benson’s sixth principle of following the prophet.
“The prophet does not have to say ‘Thus saith the Lord’ to give us scripture.”
Comment by Clark — June 24, 2015 @ 12:25 pm
I fully agree with Benson’s statement. I would never, ever say that “Thus saith the Lord” is even important to the role of being a prophet. What is crucial is when he is or is not directing the church. I think this is pretty clear in practice, although I’m sure liminal cases can always be found. When in doubt, we can always seek clarification or simply pray about it.
All attempts to inject high-minded and nuanced discussions of hermeneutics or fallibilism are, I suggest, unauthorized attempts by intellectuals to inject themselves between prophets and members.
Comment by Jeff G — June 24, 2015 @ 12:50 pm
“you seem to downplay too much”
Okay, but compared to what? Compared to the scriptures and prophetic statements in general, I think I’m spot on. It is only as measured by a modern, intellectual standard that I downplay it too much. But this only makes my point for me!
Comment by Jeff G — June 24, 2015 @ 12:57 pm
Long response, sorry.
“I would never, ever say that “Thus saith the Lord” is even important to the role of being a prophet.”
I find this statement a little ironic. Prophet to me is a verb turned noun. If you’re not prophesying (I don’t mean telling the future), then are you a prophet?
I agree that having authority does warrant a title, and the traditional title has been ‘President.’ Their authority allows them to preside and to even do so under the inspiration of the Holy Spirit. But prophecy isn’t a title to me, it’s an action.
I make this distinction, because if you take the idea that a “prophet is only a prophet when acting as such,” then the question is “what does acting as such entail?” To me, it’s when they are speaking on behalf of the Lord and revealing his words or his will, or are prophesying, or are explaining something they have ‘seen.’ This is the scriptural pattern. When they are not doing these things, they may be presiding, in which case we are still obligated to follow and sustain (although I may start to prioritize at this point). But we aren’t obligated to elevate their actions or talks with actual prophesy–especially when they turn out to just be wrong and they didn’t seem to give it in the capacity of prophecy.
Trying to put these distinctions on an equal footing causes you problems that I still don’t see a resolution for, while others can recognize these distinctions and still remain a disciple. The benefit I see with this view is that our expectations are more tempered, and we are not super disappointed or shocked when we read church history or hear something off-putting from a President or Apostle.
Comment by Pierce — June 24, 2015 @ 2:07 pm
Jeff,
Let’s talk about judgment. My position is that the number of cases where authority makes a judgment that matters for us is very, very small relative to the number of judgments we make about the meaning of prophetic statements. Also, the way we make these judgments involves us in the use of reason that is then tested by personal revelation. That is why I don’t think it makes much difference that reason doesn’t can’t question the legitimacy of authority because reason is still always involved in understanding authority and exercising judgment.
To use the example of the environmental stewardship essay. The words are so vague that different people can make them suite whatever purpose they have. Another way of saying it is that I think your theory opens up ways to listen to prophets but closes down no paths for misinterpreting prophets. Its pragmatic but not constraining.
Comment by Martin James — June 24, 2015 @ 2:37 pm
Pierce,
I don’t think I would necessarily disagree with your distinction between the prophetic gift and priesthood office. I have been a bit ambiguous on this point, but there is a reason for it:
1) To be sure, a priesthood officer is not always acting prophetically when he speaks officially. This does not mean, however, that we are under any less obligation to follow him (unless personal revelation says otherwise, of course). Our duty to follow him flows from his priesthood, not the spiritual gift.
2) The priesthood leader himself may not know when he is or is not inspired. One listener may hear the voice of the Lord while another listener (or the speaker himself) who is equally in tune with the spirit may hear nothing of the sort… And this is perfectly okay. It is not within his ability, nor is it his responsibility to let his listeners know when the Lord is and is not speaking through him. This is precisely because his authority flows from his priesthood and not his gift.
3) The priesthood office opens up the possibility for a leader to receive revelation or prophesy for somebody else. There is no binding revelation to be found in any other person, thus making interpersonal debate, comparison or some kind of back and forth dialectic totally beside the point. Since no two people have the same authority over the same stewardship, there is never any opportunity for two revelations to ever be placed upon the same, level playing field.
Given this asymmetry in access to publicly relevant inspiration, and given a person’s inability to know when they are and are not being inspired, it is a very dangerous game indeed to bring my own human arguments and evidence against that of my leader when we know that my reasoning is not inspired (I don’t have the authority) and we do not know that his is not (since he may not know).
I hope that clears up a bit.
Comment by Jeff G — June 24, 2015 @ 3:35 pm
Martin,
Again, I can’t really follow what you’re saying. I have gone to great length to emphasize that I have no problem with us using mental processes to understand things. What other way is there? Instead, I am concerned with the ways in which we justify the results of such mental processes. This is why I’m trying to drop the word “reason” for “argument”. Your counter example all seem to follow 18th century philosophers in trying to equate that specific way of thinking and arguing with what is “natural”, pure or in some sense non-negotiable and unalterable.
Quine’s naturalistic epistemology is a useful way of drawing the crucial distinction here. He suggested that all epistemological philosophy be replaced with science… and I am very much following in this tradition (what irony!). Thus, we can use cognitive psychology to understand how human arrive at or generate various beliefs, positions, etc. This, however, has nothing to do with what I have been discussing. What else is needed is to study the social structures, languages, customs, etc. in order to see how human go about justifying and (de)legitimizing their beliefs, positions, etc. within their social context. THIS is what I care about.
More specifically, I am claiming that 1) the social institutions, languages, customs, etc. of modernity do not allow any kind of intrinsic inequalities between two speakers who disagree, 2) the social institutions, languages, customs, etc. of the scriptures and Mormon gospel insist upon an intrinsic inequality between two speakers who disagree and 3) that because of this inequality built into (2), the values and mechanisms that follow from (1) are not only superfluous within a Mormon context, but actively interfere with and subvert the values and mechanisms that follow from (2).
Obviously, you disagree with (3). I’m not quite sure how you feel about (1) – agree? – and (2) – disagree? – though.
Edit: Perhaps it is because you do not agree with (0) – the difference between the psychology and sociology of epistemology – which is why I can’t figure out your (1) or (2)?
Comment by Jeff G — June 24, 2015 @ 3:48 pm
Jeff,
That does clear things up a bit, and I like how you’ve broken it down. I agree with all points completely. But it is the little caveat in #1 that, to me, you seem conflicted on, and which we seem to have a more concrete idea of what that entails.
So we agree that personal revelation can sometimes trump something a priesthood authority has said or dictated. In my opinion, many are starting to play a bit too fast and loose with this idea, since there is the scriptural precedence of accepting certain things on faith. Nevertheless, If what you say in #2 is accurate, which I believe it is in most cases (but should not for all cases where a Prophet is concerned–Joseph seemed to be able to tell when he got revelations), then it would follow even more that a lay person does not always know that they are receiving personal revelation–they just know what seems right or wrong to them after pondering about it or praying about it. And maybe this goes beyond mere feelings. Regarding personal revelation, the Lord has said “Did I not speak peace to your mind concerning the matter?” This to me means that the Lord can and does help us make sense of things in our minds.
So here’s where we’re at: We are obedient to authority by virtue of priesthood office and we are obligated to sustain, obey, and believe the counsel and doctrines they give–unless we receive personal revelation to the contrary. Revelation comes in different forms, and the receiver/giver may not always know it is occurring. One scriptural instruction is that the Lord will speak peace to our minds concerning a matter. Therefore, as long as we are humble enough to receive pure instruction and obey it either way, our minds are a part of the process of determining whether or not we should believe or follow a particular doctrine or counsel or perform a particular action.
Are we agreed? If so, let’s pop open some bubbly.
Comment by Pierce — June 24, 2015 @ 4:08 pm
Before I get to your breakdown let me give you an analogy. I’m saying that other in matters of church courts we only have the words of authorities to go on in making decisions. The analogy I would make is a statute being “authority” and the Supreme court being people trying to follow authority. You are talking about following authority regardless of reason. Justice Scalia talks about how the majority in King vs. Burwell makes an absurd decision because words have no meaning to them. I’m making a similar point in that it doesn’t matter that we give unequal status to authority if words have no meaning. I’m saying that the argument that matters is the argument over the meaning of words and that authority plays only a minor role in that process.
1) the social institutions, languages, customs, etc. of modernity do not allow any kind of intrinsic inequalities between two speakers who disagree,
I think this is obviously and patently false if we take “intrinsic” to mean intrinsic to one’s authority (and it wouldn’t make sense otherwise because you are arguing that prophets have authority based on ordination not on personal intrinsic qualities).
A few examples, judges, managers, parents, owners all have unequal status socially when they disagree.
Number 2 is not a problem for me other than unequal is very different from unconstrained by anything other than authority. The example I would use is what obligates an authority to keep a covenant with someone who they have authority over.
I think my issue with 3 gets back to number 1. I don’t think you can separate mormonism from modernity. It is part of modernity in that modern political structures create the space for religion to be practiced. I think my fundamental point is the forces of mormonism and authority you discuss are not separable in the way you think they are because of the common language that is used. I don’t think “speaking mormonism” is really possible outside of modern language conventions. Certainly, I don’t think “science” or the “academy” exist the way you think they exist. A simple example would be the sociology of government, donors, professional societies, industry, students, etc. and how all of these connections are contested at every level and in every way.
As for point 0. in general, I would say that our psychology and sociology are not very effective. One simple example is how they predicted religion to decrease in importance in a way that has not happened worldwide.
Comment by Martin James — June 25, 2015 @ 10:06 am
Pierce (34) I think Jeff’s position is that personal revelation can always trump priesthood authority. I confess I have some problem with this, again due to the interpretation issue Jeff seems to think not significant. It’s not hard to find people like Denver Snuffer who think their personal revelations have trumped the brethren.
If I daresay I understand Jeff (and I’m still not entirely sure I do) then his view is more a type of fideism. The fideism is ultimately to God but acknowledges the idea of mediation and authority. Fidelity to authority is fidelity to God unless God directly says otherwise. The reason public evidence doesn’t matter is because the issue really isn’t about knowing but about this fidelity to God. I know sometimes Jeff casts it in epistemological ways, but ultimately I think his point isn’t really about knowledge but about commitment.
The example I gave weeks ago still is the best for seeing this. If the brethren say the sky is pink when it is blue and you don’t have a revelation from God on the matter you should believe it is pink as a matter of commitment. Knowledge and facts don’t matter. Jeff discounts this because he thinks such errors or misinterpretation are either rare enough to not matter or simply don’t address issues where knowledge matters. (i.e. the authorities would never say the sky is pink)
it would follow even more that a lay person does not always know that they are receiving personal revelation–they just know what seems right or wrong to them after pondering about it or praying about it.
To my eyes knowing when or how much of ones beliefs are inspired is a huge problem. It just doesn’t seem as simple as Jeff makes out in practice. However Jeff doesn’t appear to see this issue of interpretation for either authorities or individuals as significant. It’s still not clear to me why he makes that move.
Comment by Clark — June 29, 2015 @ 1:27 pm
Clark,
Yeah I must say it makes his position very unique to me. Traditionally, the fideism route doesn’t leave any wiggle room whatsoever outside of authority (this more closely resembles my parents’ generation). On one hand, you are obligated to discount anything logical or reasonable in favor of “Elder So and So said ‘such and such.’ Whereas people like Snuffer discount the Brethren altogether based on personal revelation.
I’m curious to see if my last post had me arrive at the same level as him, albeit in a different way. Does the scripture suggest that God can use logic and reason as a form of personal revelation? I think it does, and that has been my experience. But what does that mean in this discussion?
Comment by Pierce — June 29, 2015 @ 2:50 pm
Clark,
I’m not too sure if framing things in terms of commitment is the best way of putting it. I would have to think about it a bit.
My take would be that evidence only counts as such for a particular community – and some people within that community have been set apart to decide such things for the community (no doubt there are practical constraints).
“Knowledge and facts don’t matter.”
This is absolutely wrong. Knowledge and facts are social interpretations of the world according to some community for some particular end. Interpretations can thus shift with variations in particular ends, scope of the context, social presupposition, subversive elements from within and threatening elements from with out, etc. Of course interpretations can also shift with change in the world that is being interpreted, but this is almost the least interesting case – even thought it is often treated as if it were the ONLY real case.
“It’s still not clear to me why he makes that move.”
A couple reasons: 1) The scripture do not make it an issue. 2) I am extremely suspicious of who gets empowered by making it an issue and at whose expense. 3) I think it’s a pretty clear case of intellectuals importing their own culture with its values, interpretations and problems onto the gospel. 4) I think it shows a certain lack of faith (like I’m one to talk!).
Comment by Jeff G — June 29, 2015 @ 3:06 pm
Put an other way, traditional senses of knowledge or facts. That is you’re adopting a Rortean relativist sense of those terms. You don’t go as far in his relativism just because of the place you have authority. But in terms of the meaning of truth or knowledge you more or less reject them in any sense but a very loose allegorical one. They are just social interpretations and nothing more.
To the second point, I think you’re avoiding the question of whether one is inspired because it undermines things too much. I just don’t think it’s the case only intellectual critics (typically liberal) of church positions make these claims. I’m making these claims and I’m far from an intellectual critic of the church, for instance.
The reason you have to reject any reflection on the problem of interpretation is because that would require a type of inquiry that your whole system is designed to avoid. (Reason, evidence) That is there’s no way to appeal to authority in determining if I have personal inspiration. (Well there are, such as a bishop or other authority telling me I’m not inspired, but your system oddly denies this move)
I think casting this as if it’s a question of who gets empowered seems off since in most cases it’ll be self-reflection. But the question is reflection in terms of what? The issue of lack of faith seems wrong too.
Again, I don’t think this an uncommon problem. Rather this is a very common phenomena. At a minimum think of the poor BYU student who is not self-reflexive on these matters and thinks someone they’ve just met has been designated by God for them. While that’s a funny joke most of the time, I’ve seen it happen enough that I think it a real problem you need to address. (And simply saying they don’t have any authority on the issue doesn’t address the issue since the problem isn’t exercising authority but acting on the purported revelation – often bothering people who have turned them down)
Comment by Clark — June 29, 2015 @ 3:32 pm
“But in terms of the meaning of truth or knowledge you more or less reject them in any sense but a very loose allegorical one.”
I fully reject all modernist and Greek influenced understandings of those terms, yes, since they quite obviously do not match the meaning of those terms found in the scriptures. I submit that my model is much closer to the premodern, Hebraic meaning of those terms than the modern meanings are. Whatever “truth” means in the scriptures, it has very little to do with abstract propositions or systematic inquiry of any kind.
“They are just social interpretations and nothing more.”
Some of these social interpretations are more useful than others and some are more morally binding than others. I’m not sure what “more” you could possibly want.
“I just don’t think it’s the case only intellectual critics (typically liberal) of church positions make these claims.”
By no means do I mean to imply that these habits are limited to critics of the church. You are, however, an intellectual if ever there was one. I am too. And the way that we became intellectuals was by being trained through our exposure to various authors, teachers and examiners to interpret and respond to certain things (physical and social events) in a certain way. It is when we uncritically take those ways that we have been taught to interpret and respond to the world as “natural” – and that culture definitely teaches us to think that they are natural – that we also uncritically bring these interpretations and responses to the gospel where they do not belong. This modern education system, however, was specifically designed to subvert and replace traditional interpretations and responses to various phenomenon. Just because a person does not mean to subvert and replace various aspects of the gospel, does not mean that they have not been trained to do so.
“that would require a type of inquiry that your whole system is designed to avoid.”
I am not sidelining any attempts that can be found among illiterate traditional societies. I am, however, fully sidelining any Greek influenced attempts to systematically define terms in any kind of universal and non-adaptive sense. Both Plato and Aristotle took the highest good to be found in contemplation, conception and articulation of universal forms, whether in a timeless heaven or embodied within the physical world, it doesn’t really matter. This is utterly and completely false (if not nonsense) from a Hebraic perspective, but it is quite obviously the historical origin for our modern understandings of truth and knowledge. For Aristotle, natural science is quite clearly the pursuit of truth and we ought to engage in and within his mindset the forms of matter (evidence) are morally binding in some sense. For a Hebrew, however, truth is to be found in keeping covenants that we make with particular persons – mortal and not – who sometimes change their minds across space and time and can be met within holy spaces and times. My model strives to recover this deep sense of particularity and contextuality of truth that has been repressed by Greek thinking. There are no quasi-divine forms to be found in heaven or earth that have any moral relevance to us. For this reason, evidence might be convenient, but we have no obligation to it as such. Again, I am not saying that we can simply ignore the world around us or what anybody else says. What I am saying is that any configuration of matter does not morally bind us in any way, counter to what a Greek might believe; only people can do that, just like a post-modernist might believe; and some people are authorized to morally bind us while others are not, just like a Hebrew might believe.
“That is there’s no way to appeal to authority in determining if I have personal inspiration.”
But personal revelation just is an appeal to authority. Living authorities can help us interpret it in the same way a bishop can help us interpret Apostolic statements, but they are in no position to trump or contradict it (is a practical not a logical sense).
“I think casting this as if it’s a question of who gets empowered seems off since in most cases it’ll be self-reflection.”
If things were utterly private then there would be no point in discussing it with other people; but since we do speak about such things with other people then who is and is not empowered is always and inescapably relevant. It is precisely this distribution of empowerment that gives speech acts their truths values if and only if truth is to have any moral content. Inasmuch act is totally private, then is does not (dis)empower any audience, and inasmuch as an act does not (dis)empower any audience, then it has no moral content, and inasmuch as truth has no moral content, then good riddance!
“(And simply saying they don’t have any authority on the issue doesn’t address the issue since the problem isn’t exercising authority but acting on the purported revelation – often bothering people who have turned them down)”
The problem lies in thinking that personal revelation gives one access to propositions that are consistent across different people. This is not true. A guy is inspired to think a girl is meant for him, while a girl is inspired to believe that this is not the case. So what? I have no doubt this happens a lot, but it is only from a Greek perspective that we – or the guy himself, unfortunately – are misled into thinking there is a problem. The guy’s misunderstanding is exactly that of the Protestant minister who thinks himself authorized to start a church and baptize people. Since the guy has no stewardship over the girl she is completely free to take a cafeteria approach to what the guy says in the same way that Protestant church members are free to take this same approach to their minister. It might very well be the case that the guy is misinterpreting his promptings, but from what higher standard could he ever judge this? The only thing that could contradict his interpretation of personal revelation is more personal revelation since their is no higher authority than God Himself.\
Long story short, evidence and argument stand in need of personal revelation, not the other way around.
Comment by Jeff G — June 30, 2015 @ 1:04 pm
“I submit that my model is much closer to the premodern, Hebraic meaning of those terms than the modern meanings are. Whatever “truth” means in the scriptures, it has very little to do with abstract propositions or systematic inquiry of any kind.”
So Jeff, it has been my intention to explore how far you are willing to go with this because I feel you are a pretty good representative of the traditional “authority” philosophy. So here’s my question regarding the above quote:
How do you feel about the scriptural view of the cosmos? If you believe that truth comes from revealed sources alone (Hebrew), rather than systematic inquiry (Greek), do you feel obligated to accept the idea of firmaments as taught in Hebrew scriptures, such as water above the earth and the sky being a dome with stars and planets affixed on it? Or do you accept systematic research of the solar system? Or do you not really classify our knowledge of the solar system as truth? What about things that are not really revealed in the scriptures? Am I off base with my question?
Comment by Pierce — June 30, 2015 @ 2:52 pm
Pierce,
This gets to a point I raised in comment 22. At the core of my approach is asking whether one conception of truth is itself true? Since this question sort of curls back upon itself in a self-referential kind of way this forces the question: Is it possible for an authority to have the last word in revealing that authoritative revelation no longer has the last word?
Let me make this a bit more concrete. I say that since living authorities do not teach anything about a firmament, etc. that we are under no obligation to believe it ourselves. Is this any different, then, that saying that we are no longer under any obligation to accept the Hebraic understanding of truth and authority? Personally, my mind gets tied up in knots when I think about such things.
I do think that I can say two things for traditional authority as a path to truth that I cannot say for that ancient cosmology:
1) I think that as an empirical fact, the contemporary morality of justification and legitimization within the church still closely resembles that of the ancient Hebrews – more so, at least, than their cosmology.
2) The divergent genealogies between the largely Hebraic influence upon the church and the largely Greek influence upon academia is pretty suggestive at the very least.
I think these two differences are largely explained by the logic that follows from the Mormon appeals to authoritative stewardship and revelation along with the academic rejection of such things. In other words, I think that the contemporary appeals to stewardship and revelation – something which seems tangential to a larger cosmology – that as a matter of contingent fact ties Mormonism with Hebraic tradition.
Regarding our current interpretation of the physical universe, I find it to be useful for accomplishing lots of things and for this reason I largely accept it. I do not, however, think that interpretation is morally binding in any deep sense and for this reason i wouldn’t call it “truth” in any meaningful sense. Thus, if a revelation came out that totally contradicted it, I would not lose much sleep over it.
Of course, I should also mention that I do not think reveal religion has a monopoly on truth. Not at all! When a witness in court testifies of something that goes against his own interests, that is the epitome of telling the truth in a deep and morally binding sense. I see the relationship interaction between such mortal truths and revealed truths – especially when they come in conflict with each other – as being no different from any other moral dilemma in which God’s morals and man’s morals come apart (Abraham sacrificing his son, Nephi killing Laban, etc.).
Comment by Jeff G — June 30, 2015 @ 3:42 pm
A quick question. You think it is more important who you listen than content outside the context of authority. I’m curious if you see “wardshopping” as a good thing. Since, there is considerable latitude within the moral boundaries, seeking out leaders with boundaries that fit one’s desires would seem to be a pretty valid practice. Do you agree or does it seem a bit shady to you?
Comment by Martin James — July 1, 2015 @ 3:45 pm
I’m not quite sure how I feel on the subject. Obviously, I would expect a family to pray about it, but I would expect the Lord to regularly leave such decisions up to the capable hands of a righteous family.
I guess as long as the family does so prayerfully and according to righteous desires, then I don’t see that big of a problem with it. But what I think doesn’t really matter, according to my model. ;-)
Comment by Jeff G — July 1, 2015 @ 4:05 pm
“Thus, if a revelation came out that totally contradicted it, I would not lose much sleep over it.”
“I say that since living authorities do not teach anything about a firmament, etc. that we are under no obligation to believe it ourselves.”
Your position must maintain that a revelation already has come out on cosmology: the Bible. It came by prophets, we have accepted the Bible as binding, and this hasn’t been overturned in any recognizable way. What has happened is time, science, and shifts in culture–things that your position rejects as anything meaningful as far as truth goes. Next, living authorities don’t teach it because they have adopted what science and reason have presented, and in lieu of revelation! In the “Witnesses of Christ video,” Elder Maxwell is standing in front a giant telescope and marvels at the knowledge it has given us about God’s vast creations. He was a smart guy, and an apostle to boot, and he accepted that reason can discover truth in every meaningful sense of the word.
Further, they often adopt beliefs in culture or reason that may not be truth at all, yet still teach it. It doesn’t make it truth. And if it’s not truth, then why are we beholden to adopt it? I doubt you believe in Hebrew cosmology.
D&C 93 says:
The definition the scriptures have for truth does not mention where truth has to come from in order for it to be truth. It is things as they actually are, whether it be revealed to man, or whether man discover it. The Hebrew prophets and writers who believed in ancient cosmology had their own understanding of what the earth was, but it was not truth. It wasn’t truth then, and it is not now. Now that we have taken a look outside of our planet, we have a better idea of what the earth is and how it fits into the universe. That is truth, and it came by reason. It happens on a macro level, but also on a micro level.
But you say that cosmology is not morally binding. Fair enough, although I would add that ‘morally binding principles’ and ‘truth’ are two distinct things (that often intersect). I think that there are very few morally binding doctrines, covenants, and ordinances to begin with. How much of your own reason do you depend on to determine what is/isn’t morally binding? Isn’t the beef that most ‘reasoners’ have is that the don’t like non-morally binding principles being treated as morally binding?
Comment by Pierce — July 1, 2015 @ 5:43 pm
I submit that my model is much closer to the premodern, Hebraic meaning of those terms than the modern meanings are. Whatever “truth” means in the scriptures, it has very little to do with abstract propositions or systematic inquiry of any kind.
But you’re doing more than just adopting a pre-modern view you’re saying that modern conceptions of truth or anything like them are wrong.
Some of these social interpretations are more useful than others and some are more morally binding than others. I’m not sure what “more” you could possibly want.
What does useful mean? Useful for what I want to do? Useful for predicting future experiences? Useful for making me feel good about myself?
I am, however, fully sidelining any Greek influenced attempts to systematically define terms in any kind of universal and non-adaptive sense.
Note however that I can always bring Peirce’s pragmatism in to avoid these strategies. I think Peirce avoids what you call modernism or greek without falling prey to the relativism or fideism your position entails.
But personal revelation just is an appeal to authority.
But it’s a reductio problem if knowing I have had personal revelation requires revelation. The issue isn’t authority it’s what grounds knowing when something is authoritative. That’s less of an issue when you’re in a clear dialog with a person. When the immediacy of dialog breaks down and you don’t have unfettered access then knowing what is going on – the problem of interpretation – becomes key.
I think you’re position *might* work if there always was that immediate dialog. (I think there would still be some problems, but far fewer) But the main problem is that we get only snippets and in the case of personal revelation a very ambiguous mix out of which we have to determine what is revelation.
The problem lies in thinking that personal revelation gives one access to propositions that are consistent across different people. This is not true. A guy is inspired to think a girl is meant for him, while a girl is inspired to believe that this is not the case. So what?
But Jeff, that is a basic premise about God. That he isn’t inconsistent. It’s one thing to note God’s interactions can be indexed to events. So God speaking to Noah doesn’t mean I have to build an ark, to use Joseph’s example of this principle. But the idea that God will tell us contradictory things is very much at odds with the very nature of God most people see.
I just don’t see how you can say, so what? So what in this case works only even we adopt a very strong type of solipsism.
Maybe it’s at most embarrassing or annoying with the BYU example. But consider someone like Denver Snuffer convinced of apostasy. Or consider someone like the Lafferty brothers convinced God tells them to kill someone.
These are important issues. While I recognize you position deprecates scriptures over contemporary authorities this is a common refrain in the scriptures. James 1:16, Hebrews 13:8-9, 2 Ne 27:23, Mor 8:18, Mormon 9:9 and so forth. I recognize that’s not enough to convince you. But I honestly just can’t wrap my head around your thinking God might tell one person one thing is true and say the exact opposite to someone else.
Perhaps a better question is to ask what on earth lying means in your conception of truth?
Comment by Clark — July 1, 2015 @ 8:37 pm
Just to add, I’m far from convinced the Rorty styled pragmatic conception of truth you outline is the original Hebrew view. At a minimum, the problem of lying is a serious one you have to deal with. I think you also have to explain how to make sense of passages like Heb 6:18 and what exactly that means for us.
I just don’t think any common sense or pre-modern sense of honesty allows the fluidity your position entails.
I think we can reject the notion of correspondence and universals that tends to be entailed by Greek conceptions and made worse by Descartes. However truth in the Hebrew conception isn’t just the discounting of this position. Truth is about doing not being for Hebrews. It’s closer to what the Greeks saw as virtue ethics. You’re nearly there with your focus on reliability when you discuss authority. But It think if anything you’re still caught within the Greek conception but simply negating it.
The problem of making reliability a question of authority is that it ironically discounts the reliability equation by inverting it. Authority is reliable rather than reliability making authority. I trust God because he is reliable. I build a relationship with him progressing from grace to grace. Truth in the sense of this reliability from Hebrew thought is what underpins my ability to engage in a consistent fashion.
Rather than being one way – I attribute reliability to something through fideism – it is what emerges as the relationship develops. I am true to my wife and my wife true to me because of the process of the relationship in which we are in. God is reliable because of his constant outstretched hand. This is fundamentally why I think Kierkegaard is a fundamental distortion of religion. It simply inverts the appropriate relationship.
For Hebrew notions of truth, the object proves itself reliable. We do not simply ascribe out of blind faith that reliabilism.
You’ll note that this then lines up rather well with the Peircean type of pragmatism I’ve frequently outlined. Pragmatism in this sense focuses in on what works precisely because it works in a consistent fashion. That is the inconsistencies you see as not mattering are the very things that show something to be unreliable and thus not true.
Comment by Clark — July 1, 2015 @ 8:49 pm
A good outline of Hebrew conceptions of truth can be found here
Note that this sense of truth very much allows a dynamic relationship since what counts is the reliability rather than some timeless fixed essence. The issue isn’t stasis vs. dynamism but rather reliability. That’s also why the statement “the church is true” makes complete sense. Truth in this sense is inherently tied to reliability.
Of course tying truth to objectivity is false. Truth can only be if there’s something more fundamental. What makes truth possible. One way to keep this truth is to tie truth to subjective dialog. But of course that’s explicitly the move you don’t make – avoiding that fairly Hebrew-like move that Rorty makes. I think Rorty screws it up and maybe should have listened to Levinas more. Now maybe truth in any abolutist sense requires an infinite time that we, as finite beings, just don’t have. Rather than making truth transcendent (or worse simply eliminating the notion of truth to forms of fideism) we can see truth in terms of honesty. That is openness to the other as we encounter them. Not just other people but things in general.
D&C 93:24-26 is pretty much keeping with this Hebrew sense of truth. Truth is our knowledge of things. Whatever interrupts this encountering with things as they give themselves to us by adding or subtracting is a lie. Thus truth is what resists the lie.
So again, if contradictory acts, commands, and beliefs are fine then what is it to lie?
Comment by Clark — July 1, 2015 @ 9:01 pm
Google screwed up that link. It’s inconsistent of what pages it hides. Start around 193 although the beginning is mainly contrasting against Greek conceptions. The meat comes around page 198 when he starts talking about reliability. It’s a good book and only about $12 when bought for the Kindle. Levinas, Heidegger, and Peirce are of course a tad more complex although I think they end up related.
Comment by Clark — July 1, 2015 @ 9:06 pm
I just got back from a trip to Alaska, which is why I dropped out of all the convos all of a sudden. I’ll read and respond to these points when I get a chance.
Comment by Jeff G — July 21, 2015 @ 2:12 pm